How Cognitive Biases of Diplomats Influence Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking Strategies

Written By Reyna Padaki | India

Wars are waged by states, but peace is negotiated by real people, and people are rarely rational. Although traditional International Relations (IR) theories fantasize nations as rational actors with clear national interests, real-world diplomacy is frequently led by humans with cognitive biases.

A cognitive bias is a systematic error in thinking that occurs when decisions and judgements that people make are influenced by how they process and interpret information in their surroundings. These psychological tendencies can impact how diplomats interpret information in a different light and align with their strong opinions, often without them even realizing it.

In high-stake circumstances, especially, there are several ways in which elements of cognitive bias can influence how a diplomat responds. They could disregard genuine peace signals due to confirmation bias, cling to their country’s position because of in-group loyalty, or react differently depending on how a proposal is framed.

These three threads of cognitive bias leave the future wondering what could be the implications and improvements of human psychology in International Relations, and whether peace could survive it.

Confirmation Bias

The first tether is confirmation bias, where one might interpret information to confirm their pre-existing beliefs. Considering the complexity of IR, it remains a potential risk for both inexperienced and experienced diplomats.

To comprehend beliefs or perspectives that are foreign to us, we often understand it in the context of our own beliefs, and only register the evidence we feel aligns with our ideas. Confirmation bias is a powerful trap, as it makes us less likely to question our own beliefs, which is vital to unbiased peace negotiation in the real world. It is common amongst various international and state actors who, when presented with contradictory evidence, opt to defend their stances by rejecting a different standpoint.

American political psychologist Philip Tetlock’s 2005 book on predicting geopolitical outcomes stated that “The average expert was roughly as accurate as a dart-throwing chimpanzee. Experts often clung to one ‘big idea,’ interpreting only the data that fit their narrative and dismissing anything that didn’t.”

This bold claim was later backed by how U.S. intelligence agencies addressed the Iraq war in 2003. They claimed that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), despite there being contradictory evidence from UN analyst Hans Blix. The Bush administration interpreted the ambiguous evidence to confirm what they already believed; that Sadam Hussein was a threat.

This ignorance was based on the cultural differences that the West saw with Iraq, and they failed to broaden perspective, which caused rifts in relations and threatened forced conflict.

In-and-Out Groups

Another cognitive barrier is the concept of in-and-out groups. According to Henri Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory, individuals strongly identify with the group they belong to, which fosters acceptance and belonging. This leads to in-group favouritism and out-group negative bias.

In the human brain, we subconsciously elevate the ideas and concepts of our own, while being more critical and dismissive to external perspectives. This instinct stems from evolutionary psychology where unfamiliar groups make us feel provoked and make us defend what we believe in. The idea of in-and-out groups works quietly and shapes the way we absorb information and how we are willing to act upon it.

In International Relations, this often plays out between states prioritising their allies, national identity and interest over mutual alliance and compromise in the case of an external threat. This viewpoint fuels a rigid negotiation stance, and creates an ‘Us vs. Them’ mindset, during periods or tension or conflict.

A historically relevant example of the in-and-out group structure are organizations stemming from the coalition of allies, such as NATO, AU and the EU. Considering the deep rooted differences between Russia and the United States, the creation of NATO has been presented as a threat to Soviet countries. As per the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, leaders who reaffirmed NATO’s open-door policy viewed China and Russia as threats, which reinforced in-group cohesion.

In 2021, a survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) showed that 60% of responders in Eastern Europe believed that NATO was a source for national security, while 78% of Russians (per the Levada Center) viewed NATO as an enemy. The identity-based division created a developing mistrust which led up to the Ukraine-Russia dispute. President Vladimir Putin reported NATO’s actions as “not about security, but about containment,” emphasising the Russian perception of NATO.

Framing Effect

The way information is presented to us is just as important as the information itself. This is the basis of the framing effect, the phenomenon where people's decisions are influenced by how information is presented, even if the underlying options are objectively the same.

A positive vs. a negatively framed effect can influence one's bias and emotion, despite the facts being accurate. For example, individuals are more likely to pick an option such as having a “90% success rate” rather than a “10% fail rate”. Both are statistically the same, but we would gravitate towards a more positive framing. Under stressful situations, our opinions are more influenced by our emotions and our bias, where the information we are presented with can influence how we respond to it.

In International Relations, the framing effect is a quiet but powerful tool for both constructive and persuasive diplomacy. Diplomats often leverage this tool to effectively convey peace messages or directly convey/ propose new ideas. For example, in an ‘Experimental Evidence Study on the Framing Effects in Foreign Policy’, researchers examined how different informational settings impacted Argentine public opinion regarding Brazil’s regional dominance amongst 1,530 university students.

The study displayed that when students were exposed to information comparing Brazil’s increasing economic and military power with Argentina’s weaker position in the scenario, the support for balancing regional power strategies increased by nearly 20% compared to those who received non-comparative information.

As the author notes, “Comparative frames consistently reduced support for alignment and increased the preference for counterbalancing Brazil.” This displays that framing a country's foreign policy in a comparative way can significantly change public opinion, especially in democracies.

Implications

More international and political institutions adopt reforms to improve analytics, but cognitive bias isn't a flaw in the system; it's a flaw in human cognition. It persists even with better methods, and alters how groups, or in this case states perceive, or are perceived. When left unobserved, they affect diplomacy, public opinion, and decision-making, a vital component to peaceful resolution. If cognitive bias can easily drift perception, how can international relations remain true to its objective?

The implications of cognitive bias on diplomacy are clear:

  • Confirmation bias: When diplomats only search for information that supports their existing views, they can risk misinterpreting logical proposals. A peace offer that may support alternate beliefs could be viewed as insincere or dangerous, leading to unnecessary escalation, fueled by emotion.

  • In-and-out groups: In-and-out groups are more likely to sway diplomats or peacekeepers to limit perspective, restricting collaboration and increasing a divide. They can also make them overly trusting of allies but ignorant of others perspectives. In the case of a turnover of events, where countries with differing strong beliefs are forced to work together, overcoming this challenge would be a long step and may be inefficient and dangerous.

  • Framing effect: Perhaps the most impactful implication that cognitive bias has on diplomacy is through the framing effect. The perception of data that is then communicated and processed can impact both private and public responses. For example, framing a negotiation as a “loss of sovereignty” rather than a “path to stability” can decrease involvement even when material intent remains the same.

Solutions and Implementation

We can work towards mitigating the challenges stemming from cognitive bias.

Firstly, psychological training for diplomats is something that should be prioritized. In a study conducted in 2024 on “Training to reduce cognitive bias may improve decision making after all”, researchers constructed a debiasing training session, disguised as a computer game for graduate students. Every 18 days, the 18 students who received training noticed a 29% decrease in their bias, compared to other peers. This demonstrates that even the simplest of training can have significant impact, especially because the concept of bias is overlooked in IR.

Secondly, diverse advisory teams can bring fresh and new perspectives to enrich strong debate and reactions and responses in highstake scenarios. According to a 2023 McKinsey study, organizations that prioritise ethnic and gender diversity are 39% more likely to financially outperform groups who remained biased. In a diplomatic context, this signifies a greater potential to identify spots of error, challenge assumptions, and expect other perspectives. To support this, a 2024 meta-analysis of “The Negativity Bias in Intergroup Contact” (across 238 studies and 153,000 participants) found that positive contact can reduce bias and strengthen cooperation, while negative contact can negatively impact negotiation. For diplomats, this highlights the importance of creating an inclusive atmosphere with constructive exchange, since even one mistake can overshadow peacekeeping endeavours.

Although psychology plays a significant role in IR, not all decisions are the result of bias. States also follow their own national interest, strategic calculations and power politics when they address world issues. Additionally, it's hard to prove bias without any access to private deliberations and despite that decisions can be affected by cultural, political, and historical factors.

Conclusion

Cognitive bias is the silent killer of diplomacy. In a practice that is sensitive to perception and trust, where even the smallest disruption can trigger lifelong hatred, or alliance, bias seeps quietly into diplomacy and clouds strategic intent. If the future of International Relations is to venture past misjudgment, it should prioritise implementing human psychology into negotiation.

“The eye sees only what the mind is prepared to comprehend.” – Robertson Davis

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Reyna Padaki | India
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